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Recovery of 2% System Cost 
 
The Issue and the Problems 
This paper is prepared at the request of the Fund Council (FC) as noted in the excerpt 
from the FC July 6-8, 2011 meeting record1.  Additionally, centers have sought 
clarification on the issue.  Since the introduction of the Cost-Sharing Percentage (CSP) in 
2011, it is clear that there remain problems of implementation, and there are a number 
of reasons for this.  On the other hand, and on a more positive note, earlier resistance 
from some centers to the concept itself largely has been replaced by a willingness to 
attempt to implement the policy. 
 
The problem that this note addresses is not the collection of the 2% from contributions 
to the Fund, as that deduction happens immediately on receipt of funds by the Trustee.  
The problem is collecting the 2% from bilateral sources outside the Fund.  While it is to 
be hoped that over time the largest (at least) bilateral grants will convert to window 2 
contributions, the fact remains that in 2010 and 2011 bilateral/restricted sources of 
income account for over a large proportion of CGIAR donor financing2. 
 
The implementation problems may be summarized as follows: 
 
1. There is a legacy issue: most of the existing bilateral grants in the CGIAR were 
negotiated before the reform established the CSF as a requirement.  Accordingly, 
for the next 2-3 years there will be of necessity some additional subsidy required 
from Fund donors.  Since the start of 2011, centers have been required to 
negotiate and include the 2% levy to the degree that is possible in new bilateral 
grants; 
2. Some donors to the CGIAR are either unwilling or unable (for internal policy 
reasons) to  implement the CSF policy, which means they disallow the 2% claim; 
3. Donors have different policies and acceptable overhead rate levels; 
4. Some donors propose to treat the 2% as a standard center indirect cost 
("overhead") component, but then insist that they will pay only up to a fixed rate, 
which often is insufficient to cover the true center indirect cost, let alone the 
additional 2%; 
5. There remain thousands of small grants in the CGIAR system for which collecting 
overhead and the 2% levy is a virtual impossibility.  While this represents a basic 
unfairness and continuation of the "free-rider" reality, the value is not very 
significant in financial terms; 
                                                          
1 Recovery of 2% Systems Cost:  All donors reconfirm alignment with no free riding, i.e. all contributions 
should attract systems levy.  CRP budgets should clearly indicate where and how the 2% levy is being 
collected. Conclusions:  The Consortium Office will prepare a note on how the 2% levy to cover system 
costs is collected and channeled to Window 1, describing a hierarchy of actions that need to occur to 
operationalize this.  The Fund Office and Trustee will support this effort.  The note will be made available 
for the FC meeting in Nov. 
2 In 2010, 69% of centers' external funding was in the form of restricted grants, with varying degrees of 
conditionality.  In year 1 for the 15 CRP proposals, the level of restricted funds as forecast by centers 
declined to 59%, however this still represents an actual dollar increase of $24 million over the 2010 level. 
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6. Strict adherence to the system cost policy would require that centers refuse to 
accept potentially large grants that are mission-critical to a CRP, which is in 
obvious contradiction with the goals of the reform; 
7. Other solutions such as having centers simply pay the levy from their own 
resources, if there is a significant unpaid levy from bilateral grants, present just 
another example of cross-subsidization.  There are few remaining unrestricted 
funds and they generally are generated one way or another from operating 
surpluses or other sources that started as "core donor" income. 
 
Finally, the fact that some of the donors described in point 2 above are members of the 
Fund Council makes it difficult to enforce this policy on those donors who are not 
prepared to comply. 
 
Possible Approaches to Manage/Mitigate 
Since the first CRP's were approved in late 2010, a number of thoughtful proposals have 
been made to address the problem.  The issue has been extensively discussed at many 
levels, including at the Consortium Board, Director General / Board Chair consultations, 
Finance Directors' meetings, etc. 
 
The following are possible options for proceeding to achieve the goal of financing the 
systems costs are equitably as possible. 
 
1. continue on the current path, and hope that both donors and centers will 
gradually converge to a point where substantially all the system cost is being 
collected.  In other words, do nothing.  Centers will continue to appeal when 
negotiating new grants, and the Fund Council will continue so-far futile 
exhortations to donors; 
2. require the centers to pay from other resources (earned income and/or 
additional core grants) whatever share of the 2% that is not collectable from 
bilateral donors. 
 
The consequences of the above approaches will probably be as follows: 
 
In the first case, the situation will degrade even further, but in an unpredictable way 
such that the Fund will have no idea what the requirement is going to be for reserving 
funds in window 1 annually, apart from whatever is collected. 
 
In the second case, it is likely that there would be a strong incentive for centers to make 
best efforts at raising the necessary funds.  However, this does not address the issue of a 
large donor who cannot comply.  For the hundreds of very small grants provided by 
hundreds of small sources (NGO's, small businesses, universities, etc.) there is not much 
hope of compliance - but the actual financial impact is minimal and centers could 
relatively easily pay the necessary subsidy directly back to the Fund.  This was in fact the 
November 2010 proposal from centers' financial directors.  However, for large grant 
donors who cannot comply, the financial effect is not acceptable either to the centers or 
to the Fund donors who are charged the system cost automatically, or to those bilateral 
donors who are compliant. 
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In other words, on their own, neither of the above are viable options.  
 
Proposed Solution If We Can Be Patient - The Efficiency Result 
Any reasonable supporter of the CGIAR system would agree to pay for the most 
necessary institutional costs.  The issue is and always has been to agree on what is the 
acceptable level.  There is evidence of two trends in the CGIAR system respecting 
centers' cost structures and donor behavior. 
 
1. Donors:  for a number of reasons, the indirect cost recovery in the CGIAR is low - 
as far back as 1993 when a CGIAR Secretariat study was carried out, the average 
"overhead recovery" rate in the system was 11%.  This was at a time when 
centers were much smaller than they are today and essential costs of governance 
and management were proportionately higher than now.  However, the recovery 
rate still hovers around the same level as it was 20 years ago, notwithstanding 
the fact that unrestricted funding has declined significantly in share terms, there 
is a much more sophisticated series of financial guidelines and policies in place 
for the CGIAR than was the case in 1993, and so on.  One concludes, therefore, 
that there is unlikely to be a big shift in donor behavior in this regard.  However, 
the Fund Council should clearly establish a benchmark for achievement by 
donors.  Whether it is 11%, 13%, 15%, or 20%, there should be some minimum 
contribution level below which it is unacceptable as a CGIAR donor to not 
comply.  There is also a trend for acceptance by many bilateral donors of their 
obligation to pay for legitimate support costs that are properly and transparently 
calculated and charged to specific activities.  In other words, a transfer from 
indirect to direct costing is desirable and should be the basis of continued 
development of full costing and recovery in the CGIAR system. 
 
2. Centers' cost structures:  the trends are clear.  The first one is that management 
cost as a share of total budget is declining.  This is to be expected since 
institutional size is increasing, and governance costs do not rise proportionately.  
The second trend is that centers have modernized their cost accounting policies 
and methodologies to more fairly and accurately allocate various support costs 
that in the past were considered indirect ("overhead"), to the programs where 
such services are actually directed and consumed, and where they are of benefit.  
The net effect of these trends is that we can expect the indirect cost rate generally 
to continue to decline and stabilize at about 12-13% for most centers in the 
CGIAR system, and that budgets will be more detailed with respect to how other 
support costs are calculated and allocated.  This expected 12-13% indirect cost 
figure is not simply a prediction or an aspiration, it is based on modelling at a 
number of centers and actual experience at several centers in recent years where 
improved cost allocation methodologies have been implemented. 
 
Taking the trends described above leads to fairly straightforward conclusions:   
 
 Donors must accept that a total center governance and management cost of 13-
15% is an acceptable range, if it includes the 2% system cost as a center overhead 
- we believe, furthermore, that this level compares very well with the cost 
structure of similar enterprises; 
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 Combined with a donor commitment to pay verifiable and efficiently-valid other 
support costs, the overall goal of full cost recovery (FCR) from most bilateral 
activities should be achieved. 
 
An exception should be made for very small grants, where the cost of imposition 
would outweigh the value of recovery.  At any rate, the financial effect of non-
complaint very small grants is not significant.  A review of the CGIAR 2010 bilateral 
grant landscape at all 15 centers revealed the following rather stark statistics: 
 The centers processed a total of 2700 individual bilateral grant activities in 2010, 
valued at a total of $445 million.  This represented 67% of total CGIAR center 
funding. 
 55% of the individual grant contract activities in the CGIAR were valued at less 
than $50,000 in 2010.  The total value of these contracts was $23 million. 
 2% of the value of these small grants was $461,000, which is less than 4% of the 
total system cost.  In other words, it is virtually a rounding error. 
 
Since what amounts to less than half of the individual bilateral grants provide nearly all 
the bilateral funding to the CGIAR system, and these in turn account for virtually all of 
the non-Fund-generated system cost recovery, the policy approach that should work 
and which is hereby being proposed, is to adopt the following measures over a two 
year period for full implementation: 
 
1. Fund donors agree to pay a higher share of the system cost over the next two 
years, in anticipation that by 2014 the system cost level will reduce to the current 
target rate of about 2% for virtually all donors. 
2. centers will aggressively complete their costing methodologies, consistent with 
CGIAR Financial Guidelines No. 5, to standardize methodological approaches for 
budgeting and costing, with the goal of arriving at a sustainable level of indirect 
cost charge, which could include the 2% levy - the 2% could also be a separately-
budgeted line item, but either way we estimate that the total for most centers 
that should be acceptable is in the range of 13-15% as noted earlier3; 
3. from the hundreds of small grants that realistically are difficult to comply with 
the full cost recovery policy, the Consortium will review options and recommend 
an approach for applying a project management fee (or equivalent) to all projects 
which are not subject to formal FCR.  All centers will be expected to apply this 
approach.  Such a fee may be designed on a sliding scale or other mechanical 
device that will result in a realistic levy to be applied to different levels of grant, 
by size, and which should reflect the level of center services such small projects 
actually "utilize". 
                                                          
3 This is not a proposal to arbitrarily fix the indirect cost rate at 13-15%, but rather that this is an optimal 
target to try to achieve over time.  In the past there have been suggestions that centers should adopt a 
standard indirect cost (i.e. "overhead") rate of 15%.  While such an approach might be easy to accept at 
the donor level, and it could even facilitate cost recovery, this proposal has always been rejected on the 
grounds that it does not reflect reality and also because it violates the very same accounting and costing 
principles that the CGIAR is trying to enforce.  It also would penalize smaller centers whose rates are 
always going to be proportionately higher than for the large centers.  However, if actual calculations result 
in a broadly consistent level approximating this 15% benchmark, for most centers, that is very different, 
and is desirable. 
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4. where there is a financial shortfall in recovery of the 2% from bilateral grants 
starting in 2014, centers will be expected to pay the required amount from their 
own resources, except for the by-then few-remaining "legacy projects" referred 
to earlier. 
 
How does this approach result in more efficiencies and value? 
 
An enhanced costing methodology is not only an "accounting purity" issue.  There are 
clear indications that more transparent costing and budgeting leads to efficiencies.  
Obviously, when a service is provided for "free", there is little or no incentive to reduce 
cost, modify demand, find alternative and better solutions, etc.  When a service is part of 
general "overhead", this is exactly the situation - only the donor who is asked to provide 
the payment for the overhead objects to the cost.  Internally there is little reason to 
modify behavior especially if there is no penalty or cost for not achieving the necessary 
overhead recovery. 
 
Second, the allocation of service costs results in establishing the full cost of an operation.  
This permits management to know how the center's resources are being deployed, and 
it makes it possible to arrive at strategic decisions on priorities, with full and contextual 
information. 
 
SUMMARY 
The Consortium Board believes that the proposed approach in this paper will 
substantially resolve a contentious and highly emotional problem that probably no one 
saw as such a large stumbling block when the reform was being designed.  Second, this 
proposal is a very strong incentive for the centers to accelerate what they are doing at 
present anyway, which is to modernize their internal systems and in the process achieve 
significantly greater efficiencies and cost savings. 
 
Specific actions the Consortium Board proposes to the Fund Council and CGIAR centers 
are: 
 
1. To make major effort at all levels to encourage bilateral grant donors to use the 
CGIAR Fund for financing and allocation purposes; 
2. For donors to accept to pay a higher amount of the system cost for the period 
2011-2013, for "legacy project" and center methodological reasons4; 
3. For centers to accelerate the costing working group efforts in standardizing the 
activity-based-costing and budgeting such that centers are able to lower their 
indirect cost rate to an acceptable level for all donors and which encourages 
operational efficiencies.  Donors must also agree to pay for all valid direct costs; 
4. For the Consortium Office, if necessary, to work with smaller centers in finding a 
solution that fits their circumstances, if they cannot achieve the needed lower  
benchmark rate as described in this paper. 
                                                          
4 The Consortium Office and the Fund Office can prepare a projection of what this will actually mean in 
financial terms, once the 2012 system unit budgets are prepared and once there is better information on 
projected financing of the CGIAR system overall 
